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Abstract
The exploitation of smart-contract vulnerabilities can have catastrophic
consequences such as the loss of millions of pounds worth of crypto assets.
Formal verification can be a useful tool in identifying vulnerabilities and proving
that they have been fixed. In this paper, we present a formalisation of Solidity
and the Ethereum blockchain using the Solid language and its blockchain; a Solid
program is obtained by explicating/desugaring a Solidity program. We make some
abstractions that over-approximate the way in which Solidity/Ethereum behave.
Based on this formalisation, we create Solidifier: a bounded model checker for
Solidity. It translates Solid into Boogie, an intermediate verification language,
that is later verified using Corral, a bounded model checker for Boogie. Unlike
much of the work in this area, we do not try to find specific behavioural/code
patterns that might lead to vulnerabilities. Instead, we provide a tool to find
errors/bad states, i.e. program states that do not conform with the intent of
the developer. Such a bad state, be it a vulnerability or not, might be reached
through the execution of specific known code patterns or through behaviours
that have not been anticipated.
Keywords — Blockchain, Smart contracts, Solidity, Ethereum, Formal Verifica-
tion, Bounded model checking, Boogie, Corral
1 Introduction
Smart contracts provide a new paradigm for trusted execution of code [2,50]. A smart
contract is a program that runs in a trusted abstract machine/execution environment
and has access to trusted data; its behaviour typically involves managing some digital
asset. To achieve these properties, such a program is typically run in the context of a
blockchain [2–5,13] but other technologies can be used too [20,30,54]. It can also be seen
as a way to extend the capabilities of a blockchain: the code of a smart contract can be
used to encode some transaction validation logic that was not originally implemented
in/enforced by the blockchain [4,13]. Being a program, it can have code vulnerabilities
that expose the digital assets it manages. When exploited, these vulnerabilities can
lead to catastrophic effects such as the loss of vast sums of money [15]. The ability to
reliably write transaction logic using smart contracts, and the flexibility that comes
with it, will play a key role in the dissemination and adoption of blockchains and in
the realisation of all their expected/predicted impact in society [22, 29, 49]. Hence, the
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soundness of smart contracts is a critical element in the blockchain framework that
needs to be addressed.
Formal methods have been used in many contexts to ensure that systems behave
as expected [14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 25, 28, 37, 44, 45]. It is only natural, then, that formal
approaches have been proposed for the specification and verification of smart con-
tracts [9–11, 18, 24, 26, 31, 34, 35, 40, 52, 53]. Most of these approaches focus on the
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode [3], the low-level language used by the
Ethereum blockchain [2], and on finding specific patterns of code that might lead to a
vulnerability using symbolic execution or static analysis. In this paper, we propose a
framework to analyse (in our case falsify) semantic properties of programs in Solidity [7],
a high-level language used by Ethereum smart-contract developers. Like [9, 42, 53], we
advocate the analysis of user-specified semantic properties of contracts, since their
violations can exhibit known but also unanticipated behavioural patterns leading to a
vulnerability. Furthermore, this can be used to analyse the functional correctness of
smart contracts.
We propose a formalisation of a representative subset of Solidity using our Solid
language, which is an explicated/desugared/simplified version of Solidity. It is intended
to complement Solidity’s documentation [7]. We also introduce Solidifier : a bounded
model checker for Solidity. It is based around a translation of Solid into Boogie [17,33],
an intermediate verification language, that is ultimately checked by Corral [32], a
bounded model checker for Boogie. Solidifier has been designed to find bugs, i.e.
behaviours falsifying properties, which should be then fixed by developers and re-
verified. We propose a new way to capture Solidity’s unorthodox memory model, which
is a key challenge in faithfully capturing its semantics. Moreover, our evaluation seems
to suggest that not only Solidifier (and our Boogie encoding) more faithfully captures
Solidity’s semantics than similar tools, but it does so with an arguably insignificant
verification speed overhead.
Outline. Section 2 briefly introduces key concepts of blockchains and formal verification.
In Section 3, we describe some previous works that propose frameworks to formally
reason about smart contracts. Section 4 describes Solid and its blockchain, mimicking
the behaviour of Solidity and the Ethereum blockchain. We present Solidifier in
Section 5, and our final remarks in Section 6.
2 Background
We now give a brief introduction to blockchain and formal verification concepts relevant
to understanding this work.
2.1 Blockchains and smart contracts
A blockchain is a decentralised system where all nodes have a consistent view over
its database. The concept of a blockchain was introduced to prevent double spending
in the Bitcoin network [39] but, since then, it has been generalised in many ways,
culminating in the proposal of smart contracts as a flexible mechanism to extend
its capabilities [2, 5, 13]. A blockchain is a transaction-based system designed with
a fixed set of rules that defines its basic transaction logic. For instance, they define
what types of transactions can be processed by the blockchain and what makes a
transaction valid. These rules are enforced by a consensus protocol executed by the
blockchain nodes; reaching a consensus is, to a large extent, what prevents nodes from
misbehaving and, consequently, what ensures the correct behaviour of a blockchain.
The blockchain’s behaviour emerges from the processing of transactions and the effects
it has on the underlying database. Once the blockchain network is deployed these rules
are fixed and cannot be modified. So, one way to make the behaviour of a blockchain
more flexible is to allow computation-triggering transactions, which are valid if the
underlying computation completes without raising errors. This mechanism is precisely
what smart-contract-based blockchains implement. To allow such a transaction, a
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blockchain has to define: what computations can be created, namely, what is the
language that can be used to create such computing function; how they are computed,
i.e., what are the semantics of these computations; and what is the process by which a
computation can be made available to be executed via a transaction.
The Ethereum blockchain (or just Ethereum, for short) is arguably the most
widely-known and used smart-contract-based blockchain [2]. In Ethereum, smart
contracts are ultimately executed by the EVM and are represented using its bytecode.
Two high-level languages Solidity [7] and Vyper [8] are generally used to create smart
contracts that are later compiled into EVM bytecode. An Ethereum transaction can
be used to deploy a smart contract to a blockchain address. Once deployed, smart
contract functions can be invoked using a contract-execution transaction by specifying
what address is to be called and what function needs to be executed. Smart contracts
in this platform also have a persistent state that is also stored at this address in the
blockchain.
2.2 Formal verification and bounded model checking
Formal-verification techniques use mathematical models to precisely reason about the
behaviour of systems. Most of them formalise some language in a framework that
allows some degree of automation, scalability and precision in proving properties for
programs in this language. A bounded model checker systematically and symbolically
explores the behaviour of a system up to a certain bound k looking for violations of a
given property; the bound typically represents the number of transitions allowed to be
taken from some initial state.
In this work, we use Corral [32] to implement our own Solidity model checker. Corral
is a reachability-modulo-theories verifier for the intermediate verification language
Boogie [17, 33]. Traditional bounded model checkers create a symbolic constraint
corresponding to the behaviour of an input system unwound to the given pre-specified
bound k. Corral, on the other hand, uses counterexample-guided abstraction refinement
(CEGAR) to (possibly) simplify and incrementally search the state space up to k. This
abstraction process leads to an intermediate over-approximation of the input program
that might even be sufficient to prove properties. Its intended use, however, is to find
property violations.
3 Related work
The semantics of the EVM has been formalised in traditional interactive theorem
provers [12,27,41]. The work in [26] formalises the behaviour of the EVM using the K
framework [46], whereas the authors of [24] use F∗ [48] to this end. These frameworks
are designed to prove properties of systems as opposed to falsifying them. They are
very precise and scalable (as they can establish properties of a complex system in a
reasonable time) but they have a low degree of automation and require a considerable
amount of manual effort. They are as precise and scalable as the proof engineer that
manually guides the proving effort.
SmartCheck [51], Oyente [35], EtherTrust [23] and Securify [52], in a fully automatic
way, examine an approximation of the behaviour of a smart contract to look for specific
behavioural/code patterns that tend to lead to vulnerabilities. SmartCheck [51]
translates Solidity code into a XML-based intermediate language that is later queried
for specific syntactic patterns. Oyente [35] uses symbolic execution to examine an
under-approximation of some EVM bytecode; it can be fairly ineffective as far as
code-coverage is concerned [52]. EtherTrust [23] and Securify [52] are based on the
generation of some symbolic constraints that soundly but coarsely over-approximate
the behaviour of EVM bytecode; while EtherTrust uses horn clauses to represent this
constraint, Securify uses a datalog program. They are intended to prove properties of
programs rather than falsify them.
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VerX [42] is a tool that uses symbolic execution and delayed predicate abstraction
to check temporal (safety) properties of smart contracts. It is an automated tool
that allows users to specify, using temporal logic [36], functional properties of smart
contracts [47]; sometimes manual input is required to construct counterexamples. The
solc-verify verifier [9,10] uses an approach similar to ours to create an unbounded model
checker for Solidity. It is based on a translation of Solidity into the Boogie language
which is later checked by the Boogie verifier [17]. Given a Solidity program annotated
with pre- and post-conditions, contract and loop invariants, and assertions, the verifier
tries to discharge the proof obligations derived from the specification. This sort of
modular/assume-guarantee reasoning can be quite precise and scalable but that, again,
intrinsically depends on the ingenuity of the specifier. VeriSol [53] is the framework
that most resembles ours. It uses a translation from Solidity to Boogie that is later
checked by Corral. It targets the contracts deployed to the Azure Blockchain and
checks for semantic conformance of contracts with respect to a workflow policy, which
is expressed as a finite-state machine. VeriSol not only finds conformance violations but
it derives invariants using predicate abstraction to automatically prove conformance.
4 Formalising Solid and its execution environment
We formalise a representative subset of Solidity via the Solid language. A Solid
program is obtained by explicating/desugaring a Solidity program. It has the same
constructs that Solidity has but slightly different semantics. For lack of space, we
do not formalise the evaluation of expressions. We also formalise the behaviour of
the Solid blockchain: an execution environment that abstractly captures Ethereum’s
behaviour.
4.1 Solidity and Solid
We introduce Solid (and Solidity) by presenting an abstract syntax for its constructs
in Figure 1. We only introduce the Solidity/Solid constructs that are relevant for
our formalisation; for a full account of Solidity see [7]. This grammar defines the
abstract nodes of our syntax tree and their elements. Each production rule defines
a node type and the constructors that can be used to create node instances of that
type. For instance, the program rule defines that a program p ∈ Program is a 1-tuple
with a list of contracts given by its element contracts. We use the notation n.el to
access element el of node n. For instance, p.contracts gives the contracts of program p.
Some nodes admit more than one constructor such as UserType. For a node instance
n and constructor name c, the relation n is c to establish whether n was created using
constructor c. Solid and Solidity share the same concrete syntax.
A smart contract is a stateful reactive program whose code and state are stored
in the blockchain. It can execute its own internal code but it can also call/execute
functions of other smart contracts. Smart contracts might also programmatically read
addresses’ balances and transfer currency. A Solidity/Solid program is composed by a
set of smart contracts. A contract is similar to a class in object-oriented languages. It
can declare a set of user-defined types, a set of member variables (we only consider
private member variables), and a set of member functions. While the member variables
capture the (persistent) state of the contract, the functions describe its behaviour.
All functions have an input parameter this that designates the address on which this
function is applied/called. For constructors, this is instead a local variable denoting the
address on which the new contract will be created. Functions have visibility modifiers
to specify whether they are part of the public interface of the contract. For instance,
the Solidity program in Fig. 2 has a single contract Wallet that behaves like a toy
bank: addresses can open and close an account, and deposit and withdraw money
from their accounts.
Our formalisation supports the following basic types: address, contract, signed and
unsigned 256-bit integers, and boolean. Both address and contract types are 160-bit
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Program := (contracts : Contract*)
Contract := (types : UserType*, variables : VariableDeclaration*,
functions : FunctionDefinition*)
UserType := Enum(values : Name*)
| Struct(members : VariableDeclaration*)
VariableDeclaration := (name : Name, type : Type)
FunctionDeclaration := (visibility : VisibilitySpecifier, name : Name,
inParams : LocalVariableDeclaration*,
outParams : LocalVariableDeclaration*, body : Statement*)
LocalVariableDeclaration := (isPointer : bool, dataLocation : DataLocation, variableDeclaration :
VariableDeclaration)
Type ::= UInt | Int | Bool | Address | ContractType(name : Name)
| Array(members : Type) | Mapping(domain : Type, range : Type)
| EnumType(name : Name) | StructType(name : Name)
Statement ::= WhileLoop(condition : Expression, body : Statement*)
| IfThenElse(condition : Expression, ifBody : Statement*,
elseBody : Statement*)
| VariableDeclarationStatement(variable : LocalVariableDeclaration)
| Assignment(lhs : Expression, rhs : Expression)
| AllocMemory(lhs : Expression , type : Type) | Revert
| Require(condition : Expression) | Return(expression : Expression)
| ContractCall(lhs : Expression*, type : Type, funcName : Name,
args : Expression*)
| CreateContract(lhs : Expression, type : Type, args : Expression*)
| Transfer(source : Expression, destination : Expression,
value : Expression)
| Send(lhs : Expression, source : Expression, destination : Expression,
value : Expression)
| Call(lhs : Expression , address : Expression, value : Expression)
| VAssume(condition : Expression) | VAssert(condition : Expression)
Figure 1: Grammar of Solid
unsigned integers that represent the identifier of an address in the blockchain. A
contract type, however, is an identifier annotated/typed with the type of the contract
that it stores. In addition to this basic types, we support arrays, mappings, and
user-defined types. Recursive types, even mutually recursive, are not supported1.
Assignments and function calls cannot be used as expressions; programs that do
not conform to that can be simply (and automatically) transformed into equivalent
conformant ones.
A Solidity/Solid program has access to three (implicit) variables msg, tx, block that
give dynamic information about function calls, transactions and blocks, respectively.
Each function has as an input parameter a msg struct with two members: sender gives
the address of the caller, and value the amount of currency transferred by the caller
to the callee. A blockchain transaction has an associated tx structure with member
origin which gives the address that issued the transaction. Finally, block is a structure
with member timestamp giving the timestamp of the current block.
A Solidity/Solid program can inspect the balance of address addr using the access
expression addr.balance. Constructs Transfer, Send and Call can be used to transfer
money between addresses; the latter also executes some function. AllocMemory
allocates new value in memory. While Revert raises an exception, Require raises an
exception if its condition is false. Exceptions cause the current call to be reverted and
1In Solidity, a mapping breaks type recursion, i.e. if the recursion arises in the range of a mapping,
then this is not considered a recursion. In Solid, any recursion is disallowed.
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contract Wallet {
enum Status {
None ,
Open ,
Closed
}
struct Account {
uint id;
uint balance;
Status status;
}
mapping (address => Account) accounts;
function open () public {
require(accounts[msg.sender ]. status == Status.None);
accounts[msg.sender ]. status = Status.Open;
}
function close () public {
require(accounts[msg.sender ]. status == Status.Open);
require(accounts[msg.sender ]. balance == 0);
accounts[msg.sender ]. status = Status.Closed;
}
function deposit () payable public {
require(accounts[msg.sender ]. status == Status.Open);
accounts[msg.sender ]. balance =
accounts[msg.sender ]. balance + msg.value;
}
function withdraw (uint value) public {
require(accounts[msg.sender ]. status == Status.Open);
require(accounts[msg.sender ]. balance >= value);
accounts[msg.sender ]. balance =
accounts[msg.sender ]. balance - value;
msg.sender.transfer(value);
}
}
Figure 2: Wallet contract example.
they are propagated upwards in the call stack; this propagation can be stopped by
Send and Call.
The Solidity library Verification introduces verification primitives Assume(bool b)
and Assert(bool b). Calls to these functions are represented by the corresponding
AST nodes VAssume and VAssert. We only support this specific Solidity library as
a way to conveniently introduce our verification primitives. While VAssume ensures
that its condition holds (by silently failing if it does not) at the point in the program
in which it appear, VAssert raises an error.
4.2 Explicating Solidity into Solid programs
A Solid program is obtained by explicating/desugaring a Solidity program. It replaces
some complex Solidity constructs by an equivalent set of simpler Solid statements.
In Solidity, an assignment to the length member of a dynamic array triggers a
resizing. When increasing the length of the array, only its length is altered. However,
if the array’s length decreases, the elements beyond the new length are reset to their
default values. Addresses, contracts, and integers have the integer literal zero as their
default values, while false is Bool’s default value. The default value for composite
types is created by having its members set to their default values; fixed-sized arrays
have their size constant while their data elements are set to their default values.
Although mappings have a default value, they are not reset when such a resizing
happens.
Our explication replaces assignment #array.length = #newSize, where #array and
#newSize are placeholders for an array expression and an integer expression, by the
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template:
if(# array.length > #newSize){
uint i = #newSize;
while(i < #array.length){
Reset (#array[i])
i = i + 1;
}
}
#array.length = #newSize;
Reset is a meta-function that generates the code responsible for resetting element
i of the array. This code might involve a simple Solid assignment if the elements of
the array are of a basic type; a list of assignments to reset its members if the element
is a struct or a fixed-sized array; or even another block of statements of this kind if
the elements of the array are themselves dynamic arrays. As types are not allowed
to be recursive, this explication step is bound to terminate. The assignment to the
array’s length in the last statement of this block is a Solid assignment. Hence, it has
no longer the original resizing semantics of Solidity but it merely changes the array’s
length; no element resetting occurs.
A contract has at its disposal a block of volatile storage spaces, called the memory ,
which are allocated on demand as the contract needs more resources to execute;
reference-type (i.e. structs and arrays) values are stored in it. Such values can also be
stored in storage: a persistent block of memory cells (disjoint from memory) that stores
the state of smart contracts. While an assignment between value-type expressions
results in a simple copy, one between reference-type expressions can result in deep
copying, depending on where the values of these expressions are stored. Table 1 depicts
the semantics of assignments involving reference-type expressions. A reference-type
value is represented by either a storage reference, or a storage or memory pointer.
We assume the existence of a typing environment that captures this information for
the expressions in each assignment. Roughly speaking, this environment marks local
variables of a reference type declared as in memory (storage) as storing a memory
(storage, respectively) pointer, whereas accessing a contract member variable (or their
elements) is marked as a storage-reference expression.
Table 1: Solidity assignment semantics for reference types.
Left-hand side Right-hand side Semantics
Storage reference - Deep copy
Memory pointer
Storage reference Deep copy
Storage pointer Deep copy
Memory pointer Shallow copy (Aliasing)
Storage pointer
Storage reference Shallow copy (Aliasing)
Storage pointer Shallow copy (Aliasing)
Memory pointer Deep copy
The symbol - denotes that the type of the right-hand element is irrelevant.
Our explication process transforms deep-copy assignments into the element copies
they correspond to. For structs and fixed-sized arrays, this step creates assignments
between the corresponding elements of left-hand-side and right-hand-side expressions
in the assignment. For dynamic arrays, a while loop carries the copy of data elements
whereas a simple assignment resizes the left-hand-side array. Note that assignment be-
tween elements can again trigger deep copying and would need to be further explicated.
For instance, let lhs and rhs be of type struct SA with members uint a, uint[] b. A
deep copy between lhs and rhs would be explicated to lhs.a = rhs.a; lhs.b = rhs.b,
then assignment lhs.b = rhs.b would be further explicated to:
lhs.b.size = rhs.b.size;
uint i = 0;
while (i < lhs.b.size) {
lhs.b[i] = rhs.b[i]
}
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When the left-hand-side of the deep-copy assignment is in memory, an extra
AllocMemory statement is added to allocate the space in memory for the new copy.
For instance, if lhs was in memory, a lhs = new SA(); would be added before the deep
copying into lhs is carried out. A new statement is only used in Solidity to allocate
dynamic arrays in memory but Solid extends its application to allocate any reference
type in memory. Note here that the explication steps might depend on each other.
For instance, lhs.b.size = rhs.b.size is an array-resizing assignment that needs to
be explicated. Argument passing can also trigger deep copying. It can be refactored
into assignment deep-copying by having arguments assigned to a temporary variable
of the same type as the parameter they correspond to. One can think of all of these
steps as being applied to the program until no further explication is possible.
Aside from eliminating deep copies and array resizings, our explication process
adds preconditions to expressions that might have an undefined behaviour/trigger
some exception. For instance, an array access beyond the array’s length throws an
exception and, so, we precede array access #array[i] by require(i < #array.length).
It also explicates array-push operations, adds precondition require(msg.value == 0)
to non-payable functions, and initial assignments/allocations to functions to set local
variables and return parameters to their default values.
4.3 The Solid blockchain
The Solid blockchain has a collection of addresses, for which states are captured by
address mapping s. Address cell s[addr] stores the state of address addr ∈ Address.
As a convention we use the italic name of a type to represent the set of values it is
associated with. For instance, while Address gives a type constructor in our language,
Address gives the set of unsigned 160-bit integers. An address cell is a record with
4-elements: type ∈ AddressType gives the address’ type, balance ∈ UInt gives its
balance, members and storage are only relevant when the address represents a smart-
contract instance; they store the state of the instance located at the corresponding
address. An address’ type can be Unused , SimpleAddress, or a particular contract’s
name in Contracts. Value Unused represents unused/uncontrolled addresses; these
addresses neither have a secret key or contract code to control them. SimpleAddress
represents a simple address whose balance is controlled by a secret key, whereas a
name in Contracts means that the corresponding address is an instance of the given
contract (and controlled by its code). We capture the state of Solid’s block variable
by b: a record with a single element time ∈ UInt where time gives the timestamp of
the current block. Solid blockchain’s state is given by (s, b).
The element storage of an address cell is a reference mapping : storage[r] gives
the reference cell that r points to. A reference cell is a record with two elements:
type ∈ Type ∪ {None} the Solid type of the value stored, and value the actual
value stored; value in the disjoint union of {UInt , Int ,Bool ,Address,Ref } ∪ {t ∈
Enumerations ∪ Records ∪ Mappings}. Enumerations, Records, Mappings capture
enumerations (by the sequence of its member values), records (as tuples with named
members), and total mappings. The reference type Ref holds an infinite set of
special values that can be tested for equality. None is a semantic element such that
type = None captures that the reference has not been allocated yet. The identifier
mapping members captures where member variable values are stored: members[m]
gives the reference where m is stored in storage.
The state of a Solid variable of type T is represented in a reference mapping by
a cell with value in type RefType(T ). The state of a variable of type UInt, Int, or
Bool is captured using UInt , Int , or Bool , respectively. The state of a variable of type
Address or ContractType is represented by Address. Enum definitions in a Solid
program give rise to a similar enumeration definition in Enumerations , and their state
is represented by a value of this corresponding enumeration. RefType(Array(T )) is
a record with members length ∈ UInt and data ∈ UInt → T ′, where UInt → T ′ is a
total mapping from UInt to T ′, and if T is a reference type (i.e. T is a Solid array or
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struct) then T ′ is Ref , otherwise T ′ is RefType(T ). In general, reference-type elements
of a composite type are represented by references that point to reference cells storing
the members’ state, whereas non-reference-type elements are simply represented by
their value. So, a struct is represented by a record where each member m of type
T gives rise to a member m of type Ref if T is a reference type, and RefType(T )
otherwise. Mapping(D,R) is represented by a total mapping RefType(D) → R′
where R′ is Ref or RefType(R) according to whether or not R is a reference type. The
domain type of this mapping is given by RefType(D) as we only allow Solid mappings
to have an elementary domain type. For instance, the state of a variable of type S
where struct S {uint a; uint[] b;} is captured by a value of record type RefType(S)
with members a ∈ UInt and b ∈ Ref where b points to a record value representing
Array(UInt). The state of a local variable or parameter is captured in a local context
by a value of type LocalType(T ). For a reference type T , LocalType(T ) = Ref and
the reference value points to a value in RefType(T ), whereas, for a value type T ,
LocalType(T ) = RefType(T ).
The Solid blockchain processes the following transactions:
• create-address(value) creates an address with value ∈ UInt as balance;
• currency-transfer(src, dest , value) transfers value ∈ UInt from src ∈ Address
to dest ∈ Address.
• create-contract(src, type, value, args) creates an instance of contract type ∈
Contracts with balance value ∈ UInt and call contract type’s constructor with
arguments args - this transaction is issued by address src;
• execute-contract(src, addr , type, func, value, args) executes function func of
contract type ∈ Contracts deployed at address addr with arguments args - this
transaction is issued by address src;
• mint-block is a control function that denotes that a block has been mined/-
completed.
Table 2 presents the SOS (Structural operational semantics) rules [43] that formalise
how each of these transactions alter the blockchain’s state. The variables superscripted
with •, ◦, and  are implicitly existentially quantified; the quantification is left
out to make our presentation less cluttered. Each rule defines a premise and a
conclusion. If a transaction tr and state (s, b) satisfy the premise, the blockchain
can transition to a state (s′, b′) that satisfies the conclusion; such a transition is
represented by (s, b) t=⇒ (s′, b′). The elements of post-state that are not constrained in
the conclusion are left unchanged with respect to the pre-state. We denote the path
(s, b) t1=⇒ (s1, b1) t2=⇒ . . . tn−1===⇒ (sn−1, bn−1) tn=⇒ (s′, b′) by (s, b) t1,...,tn=====⇒ (s′, b′).
For address mapping s, the function set_bal(s, src, dest , val) gives the address
mapping s′ resulting from transferring val from the balance of src to the balance of
dest in s. Function constructor(type) gives the constructor of contract type, whereas
function(type,name) gives the function name of contract type. The value zero_m
gives reference map where all references are uninitialised, i.e. they point to None. The
function init_s(s, addr , type) modifies s to store and initialise an instance of smart
contract type in address addr . For address cell at addr , its type is set to type, balance
is set to 0, and its member variables are allocated and initialised - each member
variable m of type T gives rise to m 7→ r in members and reference r is allocated
and initialised in the address’ storage to capture the default value of T . This process
allocates a tree of reference cells to capture the state of this member as per RefType(T ).
The allocation procedure precludes two distinct reference-type members/elements from
pointing to the same reference cell. We further discuss this allocation process in Sec. 5.
The function init_l(f, args) creates a local context (an identity mapping) with all
variables declared in f with input parameters initialised to their corresponding args
value whereas the other variables are non-deterministically initialised; note that our
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Table 2: Operational semantics of transactions.
Premise Conclusion
tr is create-address,
s[addr•].type = Unused
s′[addr•].type =
SimpleAddress,
s′[addr•].balance =
tr.value
tr is currency-transfer,
s[tr.src].type = SimpleAddress,
s[tr.dest ].type ∈ {SimpleAddress} ∪ Contracts,
s[tr.src].balance ≥ tr.value
s′ = set_bal(s, tr.src,
tr.dest , tr.value)
tr is create-contract,
s[addr•].type = Unused,
s◦ = set_bal(s, tr.src, addr•, tr.value),
s• = init_s(s◦, addr•, st .type),
tx•.origin = tr.src,
f• = constructor(st .type),
m• = zero_m,
l• = init_l(f•, tr.args),
c• = f•.body,
(s•, b, tx•, m•, l•, c•) −→∗
(s, b, tx•, m, l, 〈〉)
s′ = s
tr is execute-contract,
s[tr.address].type = tr.type,
s• = set_bal(s, tr.src, tr.dest , tr.value),
tx•.origin = tr.src,
f• = function(tr.type, tr.functionName),
m• = zero_m,
l• = init_l(f•, tr.args),
c• = f•.body,
(s•, b, tx•, m•, l•, c•) −→∗
(s, b, tx•, m, l, 〈〉)
s′ = s
tr is mint-block,
time• > b.time b
′.time = time•
explication procedure creates initial statements in the function f to properly initialise
and allocate these variable to their default value. The processing of create-contract
and execute-contract transactions involve the execution of a smart-contract function,
captured by predicate x −→∗ x′.
These rules make some abstractions on the actual behaviour of Ethereum/Solidity.
Ethereum addresses cannot be created with a predetermined balance as per create-
address transaction. This abstraction captures the fact that addresses and contracts
can receive currency via, for instance, a coinbase transaction [7]. Furthermore, our
formalisation makes a fundamentally different design choice in modelling the execution
of smart contracts: it uses contract types to validate executions; as per, for instance,
execute-contract rule. Solidity executes a function if its signature matches the
signature of the function being called, even if the type of the contract being called is
completely different from what the caller expects. Hence, a function with the same
signature but with a completely different behaviour can be executed. Even worse than
that, if no function matches a given signature, the fallback function deployed in the
address called is executed. To avoid this sort of behaviour, the Solid blockchain relies
on the type element of an address cell to specify and check the type of a deployed
contract, blocking calls to contract instances of a wrong type.
A smart-contract execution state is a 5-tuple (s, b, tx, m, l, c) where s is an address
mapping, b is a block-information structure, tx is a transaction-information record
with one element origin (capturing the state of Solid’s variable tx) that gives the
address that has issued the transaction, m is a reference mapping that captures the state
of the memory, l is a local identifier mapping capturing the value of local variables
and parameters, and c is a piece of code to be executed. The execution of a smart
contract alters the execution state according to the SOS rules depicted in Tables 3 and
4. If execution state x = (s, b, tx, m, l, c) satisfies the premise of a rule, a transition
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Table 3: Operational semantics of simple statements.
Premise Conclusion
st is WhileLoop, st .condition c′ = st .body_c
st is WhileLoop, ¬st .condition c′ = tail
st is IfThenElse, st .condition c′ = st .ifBranch_tail
st is IfThenElse, ¬st .condition c′ = st .elseBranch_tail
st is VariableDeclarationStatement c′ = tail
st is Assignment
(s′, m′, l′) = update(〈st .lhs〉, 〈st .rhs〉,
s, b, tx, m, l, l),
c′ = tail
st is Return
(s′, m′, l′) = update(outs(f), st .exprs,
s, b, tx, m, l, l),
c′ = 〈〉
st is AllocMemory,
unallocated(m, ref •, st .type)
m• = alloc(m, ref , st .type),
(s′, m′, l′) = update(〈lhs〉, 〈ref •〉, s, b,
tx,m•, l, l),
c′ = tail
st is Revert c′ = 〈fail〉
st is Require, st .condition c′ = tail
st is Require,¬st .condition c′ = 〈fail〉
st is Transfer,
s[st .destination].type = Address
s′ = set_bal(s, st .source,
st .destination, st .value),
c′ = tail
st is Transfer,
s[st .destination].type ∈ Contracts
s′ = set_bal(s, st .source,
st .destination, st .value),
c′ = tail
c′ = 〈fail〉
st is Send,
s[destination].type = Address
s• = set_bal(s, st .source,
st .destination, st .value),
(s′, m′, l′) = update(lhs, 〈True〉,
s•, b, tx, m, l, l),
c′ = tail
st is Send,
s[destination].type ∈ Contracts
s• = set_bal(s, st .source,
st .destination, st .value),
(s′, m′, l′) = update(lhs, 〈True〉,
s•, b, tx, m, l, l),
c′ = tail
(s′, m′, l′) = update(lhs, 〈False〉,
s, b, tx, m, l, l),
c′ = tail
st is VAssume c′ = 〈fail〉
st is VAssert c′ = 〈error〉
to a state x′ = (s′, b′, tx′, m′, l′, c′) satisfying the conclusion can be created; such
a transition is denoted by x −→ x′. Our rules assume that c = 〈st〉_tail , variables
superscripted with •, ◦, and  are implicitly existentially quantified, and the elements
of the post-state that are not constrained in the conclusion are left unchanged with
respect to the pre-state. Moreover, we use x −→∗ x′ to denote the existence of a path
of transitions (i.e. an execution) from execution state x to x′. The transition relation
−→∗ is reflexive.
The rules for simple statements in Table 3 propose loop unfolding to capture the
behaviour of a while-loop and branch selection for an if-then-else. We use expressions
in some premises to denote their evaluation in the current state. Some of our rules
rely on function update(〈lhs1, . . . , lhsn〉, 〈rhs1, . . . , rhsn〉, s, b, tx, m, l, l). It updates
the value of expressions lhsi to the value of rhsi. While lhsi is evaluated with respect to
s, b, tx, m, and l, rhsi is evaluated with respect to s, b, tx, m, and l′. This evaluation
of expressions with different local contexts is relevant for capturing the return values
of a function call. Depending on whether lhsi represents a location in storage, memory
or in the local context, this function updates s, m, or l, respectively. In the Return
rule, outs(f) gives the list of output-parameter identifiers for the function f containing
the return command.
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Table 4: Operational semantics of function-call statements.
Premise Conclusion
st is ContractCall,
s[st.args.this].type = st.type,
s• = set_bal(s, this, st.args.this, st.args.msg.value),
f• = function(st.type, st.functionName)
l• = init_l(f•, st.args),
c• = f•.body ,
(s•, b, tx, m, l•, c•) −→∗ (s, b, tx, m, l, c)
For c = 〈〉:
(s′, m′, l′) = update(lhs, outs(f•), s, b, tx, m, l, l),
c′ = tail
For c ∈ {〈fail〉, 〈error〉}:
c′ = c
st is Call,
s[st.args.this].type = SimpleAddress
s• = set_bal(s, this, st.args.this, st.args.msg.value),
(s′, m′, l′) = update(lhs, 〈True〉, s•, b, tx, m, l, l),
c′ = tail
st is Call,
s[st.args.this].type ∈ Contracts,
s• = set_bal(s, this, st.address, st.args.msg.value),
f• ∈ functions(s[st.args.this].type),
l• = init_l(f•, st.args),
c• = f•.body ,
(s•, b, tx, m, l•, c•) −→∗ (s, b, tx, m, l, c)
For c = 〈〉:
(s′, m′, l′) = update(lhs, 〈True〉, s, b, tx, m, l, l),
c′ = tail
For c = 〈fail〉:
(s′, m′, l′) = update(lhs, 〈False〉, s, b, tx, m, l, l),
c′ = tail
For c = 〈error〉 :
c′ = 〈error〉
st is CreateContract,
s[addr•].type = None,
s◦ = set_bal(s, this, addr•, st.args.msg.value),
s• = init_s(s◦, addr•, st.type),
f• = constructor(st.type),
l• = init_l(f•, st.args),
c• = f•.body ,
(s•, b, tx, m, l•, c•) −→∗ (s, b, tx, m, l, c)
For c = 〈〉:
(s′, m′, l′) = update(〈lhs〉, 〈addr•〉, s, b, tx, m, l, l),
c′ = tail
For c ∈ {〈fail〉, 〈error〉}:
c′ = c
The AllocMemory statement relies on predicates unallocated and alloc to create
of new values in the memory. While unallocated(m, ref , tp) ensures that, in reference
mapping m, reference ref points to a tree of unallocated reference cells (i.e. every
cell’s type is None) capturing the structure of a value of type tp. As for init_s, this
predicate also stipulates that two distinct reference elements in this tree point to
different reference cells. The alloc(m, ref , tp) function modifies m so that all elements
in the tree of reference cells pointed to by ref have their appropriate type, and value
is initialised to their default value, representing an initial value of type tp; reference
values are left unchanged.
The semantic commands fail and error cannot appear in Solid code and serve
to indicate that a piece of code silently terminated due to some failure and that some
error has been raised, respectively. The rules for constructs Transfer and Send
when destination is a contract have two different conclusions. They represent two
distinct rules with the same premise but different conclusions. The execution of
these statements might fail or return a different value due to conditions that we have
abstracted away in our formalisation. Hence, the non-deterministic behaviour captured
by these rules.
The rules in Table 4 deal with function calls. Some rules have different conclusions
according to a condition on c; this notation concisely represents different rules with
similar premises. All these statements have different behaviours according to whether
the underlying function called executes successfully or fails. The ContractCall
statement conforms to our design choice of checking contract types when a smart-
contract function is called. The Call primitive can be used to bypass this check. In
Solidity, this primitive triggers a specific function according to a function signature
passed as a parameter. In our formalisation, however, we ignore this function-signature
parameter and assume that Call chooses non-deterministically a function f • in the
interface of the contract deployed at address, i.e., f • ∈ functions(s[st.address].type) -
the contract’s constructor is not a member of this set.
We abstract the concept of gas. In Ethereum, the execution of statements has a
cost and each transaction is given a budget, a gas amount, that limits the number of
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statements to be executed. We make a coarse approximation as far as gas is concerned
similar to other frameworks [31]. Since we are concerned with reachability properties,
we generally assume that there is an infinite amount of gas such that computations
can run unencumbered by the amount of gas left, and errors can be reached. In
Solidity, Transfer or Send constructs trigger the execution of the fallback function
of the destination address, if the address hosts a smart contract. However, only a
small amount of gas - which does not allow for changes to the execution state - is
passed along as a budget for this execution. Hence, we abstract away the existence of
this execution altogether. We capture, however, the possibility of a non-deterministic
failure in this execution.
The Solid blockchain also abstracts away Ethereum’s use of a cryptographic hash
function to compute storage locations and new contract addresses. Instead of explicitly
computing this function, we see it as an abstract injective function. Hence, we
capture its usage by assuming that computed storage locations for different reference-
type elements are unique and new addresses are fresh. Our function init_s ensures
that different elements are stored in different reference cells in storage, whereas
s[addr ] = Unused denotes that address addr is fresh. As practical hash functions are
not injective – albeit highly improbable, two different inputs can produce the same
output: a collision – in Solidity, two different storage elements could end-up being
stored in the same location or a new contract could be deployed in an already active
address. However, we specify the Solid blockchain in a way these cases are impossible.
Finally, unlike Solidity/Ethereum, our formalisation eagerly reports errors. Hence,
it does not allow, for instance, a function to recover from an error by reverting after
the error has happened. We plan to propose an alternative formalisation (and Boogie
encoding) where errors are lazily reported, more faithfully representing Solidity’s
behaviour. A far-from-convenient stop-gap solution consists of manually modifying
Solidity programs to check for errors before they happen.
These abstractions cause the behaviour of Solid/its blockchain to over-approximate
that of Solidity/Ethereum and, therefore, it can reach states that are unreachable in
Ethereum.
5 Bounded model checking Solidity with Solidifier
Solidifier is a bounded model checker for Solidity that is based on an encoding of Solid,
and its blockchain’s behaviour, as a Boogie program, which is later checked by Corral.
5.1 Solid to Boogie
Boogie [33] is a simple but powerful formal (intermediate verification) language that
is used to formalise the behaviour of programming languages. Fig. 3 presents some
Boogie constructs that we use in our encoding. Boogie does not support the declaration
of enumerations and records but they can be simply modelled using other constructs.
The concrete syntax of Boogie is in bold font, and we use
[ ]
, ? and * to group
language elements, declare that elements are optional and express a sequence of
elements, respectively. Bold-font square brackets are part of the concrete syntax of
Boogie and are used in [Type] Type’ to denote a total mapping from Type to Type’.
A Boogie program declares some global variables and procedures. The procedures
declare some local variables and a list of statements describing its behaviour. Boogie
not only supports traditional commands such as while-loop, if-then-else, assignment
and procedure call, but it also supports specification-based statements. The assume
command makes the program fail silently, assert generates an error if its condition
is not met, and havoc non-deterministically assigns a new value to its expression2.
As expressions, Boogie has left-value expressions: identifier, mapping access, record
access; integer arithmetic and boolean expressions; quantified expressions; etc.
2Boogie only allows havoc to act on a variable but it is fairly straightforward to model how it
could be applied to a “left-value" expression.
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Prog ::=
[
VarDec | Proc
]
*
NameType ::= Name : Type
TypeDef ::= enum Name = (Name
[
, Name
]
*)
| record Name = (NameType
[
, NameType
]
*)
VarDec ::= var NameType
Proc ::= procedure Name (NameType
[
,NameType
]
*)[
returns (NameType
[
,NameType
]
*)
]
? {VarDec* Stmt*}
Stmt ::= while (Expr) {Stmt*}
| if (Expr) {Stmt*}
[
else {Stmt*}
]
?
| Expr := Expr | call Expr* := Name(Expr*)
| assume Expr | assert Expr | havoc Expr |
tbfreturn
Type ::= int | bool | [Type] Type | enum(Name)
| record(Name)
Figure 3: Grammar for a subset of Boogie
We encode a Solid program S into a Boogie program B, capturing the behaviour
of its smart contracts. Program B represents the execution states via global variables
and smart-contract functions are translated in procedures. It uses the following global
variables to represent the execution state.
record AddressCell = (type : enum(AddressType), balance: UInt ,
members : [enum(MemberIds)] Ref , storage : [Ref] RefCell);
record RefCell = (type : enum(RefTypes), value : record(RefValues));
record BType = (time : UInt);
record TxType = (origin : Address);
record MsgType = (value : UInt);
var s : [Address] AddressCell;
var b : BType;
var tx : TxType;
var m : [Ref] RefCell;
Each variable captures its corresponding element in the execution state. We use Ref,
Address, UInt, and Int to represent types Ref , Address, UInt and Int , respectively3.
Let C1, . . . , Cn be the names of contracts declared in S, enum AddressType has values
None, SimpleAddress, C1, . . .,Cn. The enumeration enum MemberIds lists the identifiers
of member variables accross all contracts in S. The enumeration enum RefTypes lists
unique tags for all Solid types in S whose values can be stored in a reference cell. Finally,
let t1, . . . , tm be all the Solid types in S whose values can be stored in a reference cell,
record RefValue captures the disjoint-union type of all RefType(t1) . . . ,RefType(tm).
The behaviour of Solid statements is captured in Boogie as follows. While and
if-then-else constructs are trivially encoded using their Boogie counterparts. The
update function is encoded using Boogie’s assignment statement; it updates either
some location in s[this].storage or m, or a local variable. Function set_bal is simply
encoded by a block of Boogie code that updates the balances of the concerned addresses.
The semantic command fail is mapped to a failing assume whereas error is to a
failing assert. The non-deterministic behaviour of Transfer and Send is captured by
a non-deterministic if-then-else Boogie construct, namely, where the condition is given
by the non-deterministic boolean value *. These functions’ encodings can be used to
implement in Boogie all simple statements in Table 3 except for AllocMemory. We
3These are implemented using Boogie’s int and where clauses when appropriate. For a given
variable, a where clauses specifies a condition that must be met every time this variable is non-
deterministically assigned, i.e. either when initialised or when havoced.
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use auxiliary functions Allocation and Initialisation to generate the Boogie code to
capture AllocMemory.
The Boogie code denoted by Allocation(refMap, refExp, T ) allocates at reference
refExp in reference mapping refMap a fresh tree of reference cells capturing the
structure of Solid type T . It is given by:
assume m[refExp ].type == None;
m[refExp ].type := T ;
Allocate(refMap, refExp, T, vars)
The meta-function Allocate(refMap, refExp, T, vars), where vars is an auxiliary parame-
ter capturing a list of variable declarations, creates the following Boogie code block. If T
is a value type or a composite type with value-type elements, Allocate(refMap, refExp, T.vars) =
assume true. For T a struct with reference-type members m1 : T1, . . . ,mn : Tn:
allocate(refMap, refMap[refExp].value.m1, T1, vars)
. . .
allocate(refMap, refMap[refExp].value.mn, Tn, vars)
Allocate(refMap, refMap[refExp].value.m1, T1, vars)
. . .
Allocate(refMap, refMap[refExp].value.mn, Tn, vars)
For T a Solid array with elements of type T ′:
allocate(refMap, refMap[refExp].value.data[v], T ′, vars_〈v : Int〉)
Allocate(refMap, refMap[refExp].value.data[v], T ′, vars_〈v : Int〉)
For T a Solid mapping from type T ′ to type T ′′:
allocate(refMap, refMap[refExp].value[v], T ′′,
vars_〈v : RefType(T ′)〉)
Allocate(refMap, refMap[refExp].value[v], T ′′,
vars_〈v : RefType(T ′)〉)
For vars 6= 〈〉, allocate(refMap, refExp, T, vars) corresponds to the following block of
Boogie code; vars ′ are new variables mirroring vars and refExp′ is the result of replacing
variables in vars by their counterparts in vars ′ for refExp, and diff (〈v1, . . . , vn〉, 〈v′1, . . . , v′n〉) =
v1 6= v′1 ∨ . . . ∨ vn 6= v′n.
assume ∀vars • refMap[refExp].type = None;
assume ∀vars, vars′ • diff (vars, vars′)⇒ refExp 6= refExp′;
preRefMap := refMap;
havoc refMap;
assume ∀r : Ref • preRefMap[r].type 6= None
⇒ preRefMap[r] = refMap[r];
assume ∀vars • refMap[refExp].type = T ;
If vars = 〈〉, however, it then corresponds to:
assume refMap[refExp].type = None;
refMap[refExp].type := T ;
To illustrate this construction, we present the Boogie code block created by
Allocation(m, refExp, S) where struct S {uint a; uint[] b; uint[][] c}:
assume m[refExp ].type == None;
m[refExp ].type := S;
assume m[m[refExp ].value.b].type == None;
m[m[refExp ].value.b].type := uint[];
assume ∀ v : int •
m[m[m[refExp ].value.c].value.data[v]]. type
== None;
assume ∀ v : int , v’ : int • v != v’ ⇒
m[m[m[refExp ].value.c].value.data[v]]. value !=
m[m[m[refExp ]. value.c].value.data[v]]. value;
preM := m;
havoc m;
assume ∀ r : Ref •
preM[r].type != None ⇒ preM[r] == m[r];
assume ∀ v : int •
m[m[m[refExp ].value.c].value.data[v]]. type
== uint[];
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As Solid types cannot be recursive, the computation of Boogie code with Allocation
is guaranteed to finish. Note that no two different reference-type elements can point to
the same reference cell. We use Initialisation(refMap, refExp, T ) to denote a sequence
of assume statements used to initialise the (reference-cell tree rooted at) reference
refExp in reference mapping refMap to the default value of Solid type T . It works
similarly to its Allocation counterpart. Executing Allocation(m, ref , T ) followed by
Initialisation(m, ref , T ) causes an update from m to m′ = alloc(m, ref , T ), where ref is a
reference that satisfies unalloc(refMap, ref , T ), as per AllocMemory rule.
The Solid function-call statements in Table 4 are encoded as Boogie procedure
calls. A contract call is encoded as the call to a procedure corresponding to the
contract function called. Solid’s Call is encoded by procedure callP and the function
init_s used to implement CreateContract is implemented by the Boogie code block
DeployContract ; both are defined later. Boogie’s argument passing mechanism captures
the effects of function init_l . As for Solid expressions, they are encoded using their
corresponding Boogie counterpart. Arithmetic expressions are encoded using Boogie’s
operations on mathematical integers with the addition of wrap-around behaviour to
capture overflow or underflow for Solidity’s bounded integers. This choice is based on
the findings in [9].
Our Boogie encoding relies on lazy contract deployment. A function might call a
yet uninitialised address. In this case, before the function is executed, the appropri-
ate contract is deployed at this address. For contract C with member variables m1 :
T1, . . . ,mn : Tn, the lazy deployment is carried out by block LazyContractDeployment(C):
if (s[this].type == Unused) {
s[this].type := C;
Allocation(s[this].storage ,
s[this]. members[m1],T1);
. . .
Allocation(s[this].storage ,
s[this]. members[mn],Tn);
}
assume s[this].type == C;
Functions also have a condition that ensures that memory references are well typed.
For any reference-type parameter p with type T in Solid function f of contract C,
block MemoryReferenceParametersWellTyped(C, f) creates assume m[p].type == T .
Program B uses the following procedure to capture the behaviour of Solid function
f of contract C with name funcName, input parameters names ip1, . . . , ipipn with
corresponding types ipT1, . . . , ipTn, out parameters names op1, . . . , opopn with types
opT1, . . . , opTopn, and local variables names lv1, . . . , lvlvn with types lvT1, . . . , lvTlvn.
procedure C_funcName(ip1 : LocalType(ipT1),
. . .,
ipipn : LocalType(ipTipn))
returns (op1 : LocalType(opT1),
. . .,
opipn : LocalType(ipTipn))
{
AuxiliaryVariables
var lv1 : LocalType(T1);
. . .
var lvlvn : LocalType(Tlvn)
LazyContractDeployment(C)
MemoryReferenceParametersWellTyped(f)
Statements(f.body)
}
While AuxiliaryVariables declares, for instance, variables to capture pre-memory
and pre-storage for allocation purposes, Statements(f.body) translates f.body into
Boogie. The constructor uses DeployContract(C) defined in the following instead of
LazyContractDeployment(C).
s[this].type := C;
s[this]. balance := 0;
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Allocation(s[this].storage ,
s[this]. members[m1],T1);
. . .
Allocation(s[this].storage ,
s[this]. members[mn],Tn);
Initialisation(s[this].storage ,
s[this]. members[m1],T1);
. . .
Initialisation(s[this].storage ,
s[this]. members[mn],Tn);
Note that while LazyContractDeployment(C) deploys an instance of C where
the values of member variables and its balance are non-deterministically initialised,
DeployContract(C) creates an instance with their default values.
5.2 Verification harnesses
We propose two verification harnesses, a contract and a function harness, to drive
the exploration of the blockchain’s behaviour searching for errors. They define a main
procedure, and a callP procedure capturing Solid’s Call construct.
5.2.1 Contract harness
For a contract of type C, the main procedure of the contract harness creates an instance
of C at the address given by global variable main_contract, by calling its constructor,
and executes an arbitrary sequence of interface functions. This procedure ensures
that the initial non-deterministically-created reference cells of m are well typed and
that initially s records each address as either unitialised or a simple address. For
each new interface function call (the constructor is not an interface function), it
non-deterministically initialises b, tx and the arguments for the function being called.
For each new call, it also havocs the storage and balance of all addresses except for
main_contract: basic values can change but references and reference-cell types are
fixed.
The Call construct is treated as an external/unknown function call. The procedure
callP can execute any (finite) sequence of interface functions of C on main_contract.
Unlike our formalisation, we do not non-deterministically chose a function in the
interface of the contract being called.
Since this harness precisely (up to abstractions) deploys and executes the contract C
at address main_contract, the interface functions calls are executed from valid/reachable
states of C, namely, states satisfying C’s invariants.
5.2.2 Function harness
Our function harness executes a single call to a chosen function f of contract C. It
analyses the behaviour of f when execution from a non-deterministically initialised
state of C. The main procedure simply calls the procedure corresponding to f , whereas
callP havocs (in a controlled way) storage and balance of all addresses to denote that
some arbitrary execution took place.
Unlike our contract harness, the function f might execute from a state that is not
reachable by a well-behaved instance of contract C, thus possibly reaching actually
unreachable errors. However, this harness can find deep errors that might not be
reachable by our contract harness, given a fixed bound. While the contract harness
examine bounded executions starting in the contract’s initial state, the function harness
examines bounded executions starting from any state.
5.3 Solidifier
Solidifier carries out a bounded verification of Solidity programs looking for failing
assertions. It translates a Solidity program into a corresponding Solid program, which
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Table 5: Results for Azure workbench examples.
Example Solidifier solc-verify VeriSol Mythril
AssetTransfer 2.24 (×) 0.74 (×) 2.68 (×) 79.22 (×)
BasicProvenance 0.91 (×) 0.46 (×) 1.74 (×) 10.18 (×)
ItemListingBazaar 3.76 (×) 0.53 (×) 3.93 (×) 106.18 (×)
DigitalLocker 1.72 (×) 0.56 (×) 1.93 (×) 36.51 (×)
DefectiveComponentC 6.29 (×) 0.49 (×) 5.11 (×) 1.97 (bd)
FrequentFlyerRC 0.71 (X) 0.51 (×) * *
HelloBlockchain 0.74 (×) 0.46 (×) 1.58 (×) 5.81 (×)
PingPongGame 1.91 (×) 0.52 (×) 3.41 (×) 184.28 (×)
RefrigeratedTrans 1.01 (×) 0.50 (×) 1.96(×) 86.67 (×)
RefrigeratedTransWithTime 1.44 (×) 0.49 (×) 1.96 (×) 112.04 (×)
RoomThermostat 0.66 (X) 0.46 (X) 1.62 (×) 11.70 (ot)
SimpleMarketplace 0.93 (×) 0.48 (×) 1.73 (×) 10.68 (×)
is later encoded into Boogie and checked with Corral. It runs the Solidity compiler4
as an auxiliary tool to check if the input Solidity program is valid and to generate its
typed abstract syntax tree, later parsed by Solidifier. The user of Solidifier chooses
between a contract or function harness. Solidifier also interprets Corral results and
information back into Solidity. Aside from the verification primitives declared, functions
prefixed with CexPrint_ and with a single basic-type parameter can be declared in
the Verification library. When called, they inform Solidifier to print the argument’s
value at that point in a counterexample, if one reaching this call exists. Solidifier
might output: a counterexample leading to a failing assertion, that no assertion failing
assertion can be ever reached, that no failling assertion could be reached for the
predetermined bound, or it might fail to produce any output if the underlying solver
is unable to solve the constraints generated by Corral5.
Solidifier is incomplete by nature as it only explores the behaviour of a contract up
to a given bound and it is sound with respect to our verification abstractions on the
behaviour of Solid/its blockchain but it is unsound with respect to Solidity/Ethereum.
Assuming an infinite amount of gas for computations or that the hash function used by
Solidity is collision-free as we do, for instance, makes Solidifier unsound with respect to
Solidity/Ethereum: some violations reported by our tool might not actually happen in
Solidity/Ethereum. However, these abstractions, also made by other tools [9, 53], are
useful for verification as they remove some often unnecessary details from our encoding,
leading to better performance and accuracy. We make a considerable effort to explain
the abstractions we make with respect to Solidity/Ethereum. Thus, Solidifier should
be used with this caveat in mind.
Table 6: Results for Azure workbench fixed examples.
Example Solidifier solc-verify VeriSol Mythril
AssetTransfer 1.43 (X) 0.57 (X) 2.10 (bd) 1.20 (bd)
BasicProvenance 0.63 (X) 0.48 (×) * 10.28 (bd)
ItemListingBazaar 2.26 (X) 0.54 (×) * 111.13 (ot)
DigitalLocker 1.02(X) 0.56 (×) * 35.27 (bd)
DefectiveComponentC 0.70 (X) 0.49 (×) * 2.05 (bd)
HelloBlockchain 0.66 (X) 0.46 (X) 1.62 (bd) 5.53 (bd)
PingPongGame * 0.52 (×) 30.38 (bd) 189.63 (bd)
RefrigeratedTrans 0.88 (X) 0.50 (×) * 87.03 (bd)
RefrigeratedTransWithTime 0.89 (X) 0.51 (×) * 111.93 (bd)
SimpleMarketplace 0.64 (X) 0.48 (X) * 11.11 (bd)
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Table 7: Results for other examples.
Example Solidifier solc-verify VeriSol Mythril
Aliasing 0.90 (X) 0.47 (X) 1.76 (×) 6.89 (bd)
StorageDeterministicLayout 0.83 (X) 0.48 (×) 1.79 (×) *
OpenAuction * 0.49 (X) 1.98 (bd) 20.10 (ot)
OpenAuctionWithCall 2.67 (×) 0.52 (×) Error 20.16 (ot)
Voting * 0.57 (×) 2.10 (×) *
Wallet 1.72 (×) Error 1.87 (×) 25.30 (bd)
WalletNoOverflow * Error 1.81 (×) 27.60 (bd)
WalletNoOverflowButCall 1.84 (×) Error Error 43.80 (ot)
WalletNoOverflowButCallWithLocking * Error Error 50.84 (ot)
5.4 Evaluation
We illustrate the capabilities of Solidifier by comparing it against solc-verify [9, 10],
VeriSol [53] and Mythril [38] in the analysis of 23 contracts. We conducted our
evaluation in a Docker container running on a MacBookPro with Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-8559U CPU @ 2.70GHz and 16GB of RAM, and with Docker Engine 18.09.1.
Instructions to build this container, the Solidifier binary, and the examples used in
this evaluation can be found in [6].
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of analysing the Solidity contracts of the
Azure blockchain workbench [1]. These smart contract samples are accompanied by
an informal textual specification describing what high-level transitions can happen,
which we captured with assertions. We fixed the contracts that did not meet their
corresponding specification. While Table 5 presents the result for the original contracts,
Table 6 presents the results for the fixed ones. For each program, we give the time
taken in seconds to analyse the contract with the outcome in parenthesis: × means
that a violation was found, X that the properties have been proved, bd represents that
no violation has been found in the portion of behaviour analysed (within a transition
bound, for instance), ot that some violation for an unspecified property has been
found (it only applies for Mythril as it does a comprehensive analysis of “dangerous"
code/execution patterns and not only assertion checking), Error reports a tool’s
internal error, * represents a timeout in the analysis of the contract, - denotes that
fixing was not needed. We set a 300 seconds timeout for analysing each program. The
cells with a grey background present a wrong output: they either state that a violation
exists when it does not or that a property holds when it does not. We refer to precision
as relating to the number of wrong outputs; the more precise the tool is the fewer
wrong outputs it provides. Solidifier uses Corral with a fixed recursion/unwinding
bound of 128; this bound is also set for VeriSol.
The properties that we specify for these contracts are mostly local; they restrict pre-
and post-states of functions calls. Corral’s lazy-inlining over-approximation is usually
sufficient to (unconditionally) prove such properties [32]. For Stater in PingPongGame,
however, the property is not local and proving it requires deriving a non-trivial invariant
for a recursion.
Table 7 presents other examples with violations arising from more intricate be-
haviours such as integer overflows or re-entrancy. Examples OpenAuction, OpenAuc-
tionWithCall, and Voting are modified versions of their counterparts in the Solidity
documentation [7], whereas the other examples were created by us. For OpenAuc-
tion(WithCall) we capture the correctness of refunding someone’s bid, whereas for
Voting we capture the invariant that the number of votes initially available is equal to
the sum of votes still to be cast plus votes already cast throughout the election process.
For Aliasing and StorageDeterministicLayout, we use our function harness to analyse
function t. While Aliasing captures properties arising from Solidity’s memory model
and its different aliasing/deep-copy possibilities, StorageDeterministicLayout tries to
4https://github.com/ethereum/solidity
5The use of undecidable theories such as non-linear arithmetic, which we use to capture the modulo
and multiplication operation, might lead the underlying solver to an inconclusive result.
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capture properties arising from the deterministic organisation of member variables in
storage. Finally, all the versions of Wallet, based on Fig. 2, intend to capture (code
and properties of) a typical use of smart contracts to tokenise digital assets.
These results are entirely consistent with how these different tools operate. Mythril
is the archetypical traditional tool that uses symbolic execution to explore some portion
of a contract’s EVM-/low-level behaviour. As such, it should be the most semantically-
faithful checker but this faithfulness comes at the expense of speed: it does not report
any imprecise result but its analyses take much longer than the others. It should be
noted that Mythril checks and reports errors for multiple properties. solc-verify uses
the Boogie verifier and its intrinsic over-approximative (assume/guarantee) style of
verification. Without user-input annotations (such as contract invariants) to more
precisely/narrowly capture the behaviour of a contract, its functions are generally
analysed as if they were executed from an arbitrary contract state. Hence, many false
errors are reported. VeriSol and Solidifier have similar results in terms of precision, but
they differ as far as speed is concerned. We attribute their difference in precision and
speed to different Boogie modellings of Solidity as well as to distinct configurations of
Corral.
These results seem to suggest that Solidifier fares similarly to other Solidity-to-
Boogie-translation-based tools in terms of analysis speed but it is better as far as
precision (as in not reporting wrong outcomes) is concerned. Solidifier, VeriSol and
solc-verify use different Boogie modellings and support different subsets of Solidity.
These aspects should have a direct influence in their precision and speed. Based on
these results, it seems that Solidifier captures more faithfully the behaviour of Solidity
as compared to these other tools, and specially its memory model, as illustrated by
the results Aliasing and StorageDeterministicLayout analyses. The violations that we
found were reached with few function calls which seems to suggest that using bounded
model checking with a small bound would be enough to find many common errors.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a formalisation of a core subset of Solidity using the Solid language,
and a translation of it into Boogie, providing the basis for Solidifier: a bounded model
checker that uses Corral to look for semantic-property violations. There are some
strong arguments in favour of the approach we propose in comparison to the current
state of the art. Firstly, formalising Solidity directly as opposed to EVM bytecode
creates a cleaner semantic basis for analysing smart contracts; no need encode low-level
operations and let developers bridge the compilation gap from Solidity to bytecode.
Secondly, encoding semantic properties, rather than looking for known vulnerable
code patterns, allows the designer of a smart contract to precisely specify what is
expected from the contract. Their verification might uncover vulnerabilities that are
reachable by unknown behaviour patterns or even function errors; neither of which
would be found by traditional tools. Thirdly, bounded model checking systematically
and symbolically explores all execution paths of a contract up to a certain depth,
so it is guaranteed to find an error within the given bound. This exploration tends
to exercise all code paths of a smart contract but not all execution paths. On the
other hand, current ad-hoc symbolic execution techniques for the analysis of smart
contracts typically either too coarsely over-approximate the general behaviour of a
smart contract instance, leading to inaccurate violations, or they exercise/cover a small
portion of the smart contract’s code, missing violations. Our evaluation suggests that
our approach is more effective at identifying errors for smart contracts. Amongst tools
implementing this approach, Solidifier seems to more faithfully capture the semantics
of Solidity while remaining as fast as other tools.
A natural question that arises from this work is: what types of contracts are
there/can be implemented and what are the semantic properties they should conform
to? We plan to conduct a systematic study to address this question.
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